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Voir Dire in Kentucky: An Empirical
Study of Voir Dire in Kentucky
Circuit Courts
By WILLIAM H. FORTUNE*
INTRODUCTION
Voir dire1 is the stage of a jury trial at which prospective
jurors are questioned under oath by court or counsel to deter-
mine their suitability as jurors in the case to be tried. Ken-
tucky's high court has repeatedly recognized the importance
of voir dire2 to the exercise of for-cause and peremptory
challenges.'
The trial judge's wide discretion in voir dire, however,
necessarily makes a review of appellate decisions of minimal
assistance in ascertaining what actually occurs during this im-
portant phase of a jury trial. Published opinions provide little
guidance in this area; information about voir dire must come
from a study of the trial process.
Therefore, in order to gain a perspective on Kentucky
voir dire practices, the author conducted a comprehensive sur-
vey of Kentucky circuit court judges. This survey involved a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B. 1961,
J.D. 1964, University of Kentucky.
The author was in private practice in Lexington, Kentucky from 1964-69, was
Assistant Federal Defender in Los Angeles, California from 1975-76, and was Federal
Defender for the Eastern District of Kentucky from 1977-79.
1Voir dire literally means "to say truly."
2 The Kentucky Court of Appeals' recognition of voir dire examination as a
means to challenge biased jurors was noted in Temperly v. Sarrington's Adm'r, 293
S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1956), where the court stated that "counsel should be given a fair
opportunity to question the jurors on voir dire to discover whether or not any of the
prospective jurors have bias or prejudice in the case to be tried." Id. at 868.
Similarly, the Kentucky Court has recognized the relationship between voir dire
and peremptory challenges. In Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.2d 984 (Ky.
1949), the Court said: "[A] litigant is entitled to make inquiry of jurors in respect to
any matter which will throw light on the background of the juror in order that the
litigant may better exercise his discretion in respect to peremptory challenges. Id. at
989.
3 A challenge for cause is a challenge for implied or actual bias. A peremptory
challenge is a challenge for which no reason need be assigned.
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written questionnaire that was sent to all circuit judges,
eighty percent of whom completed it, and follow-up interviews
with fifteen randomly-selected judges. This article analyzes
the results of the study and recommends standards to guide
the discretion of trial judges.
I. THE ORIGINS OF VomI DIRE
At common law, both voir dire examination and the exer-
cise of challenges were severely limited. Peremptory chal-
lenges were provided in felony cases,4 although not in civil or
misdemeanor cases,5 while challenges for cause were provided
in all cases.6 Questioning of jurors prior to the exercise of
challenges, however, was not permitted;7 such interrogation
was allowed only after challenge, and then only if the ques-
tioning would not dishonor or discredit the juror.8 In eight-
eenth century England voir dire was rare, and the exercise of
challenges was based, of necessity, on personal knowledge,
pre-trial investigation and first impressions." These practices
have persisted in England, with voir dire non-existent and
challenges rare.10 By contrast, in this country voir dire and
challenges are considered essential to a fair trial. Evidence in-
4 At early common law the accused was given 35 peremptory challenges, while
the Crown was provided an unlimited amount. By the eighteenth century the defen-
dant's peremptory challenges were limited to 20, while the Crown was given none. 5
M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw 362-65 (1844); Moore, Voir Dire Exami-
nation of Jurors-Part I. The English Practice, 16 GEo. L.J. 438, 447 (1928).
' Moore, supra note 4, at 448.
' Such challenges, known as "challenges to the polls," were proper when the
juror was incompetent because he owned insufficient property, because he was an
alien or a minor, or because he had been convicted of an infamous offense. Such
challenges were also proper when the circumstances warranted suspicion of bias. Such
bias could be either actual or implied by law because of the relationship between the
juror and the party or cause. Id. at 440-41.
1 P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 28-29 (1956); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 289-91 (1952).
" Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional
Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290, 292-93 (1972).
9 Moore, supra note 4, at 445.
'0 P. DEVLIN, supra note 7, at 29-30. "What strikes most forcibly the American
Lawyer who attends an English jury trial is the absence of any preliminary examina-
tion of the prospective jurors, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is
ground for challenge. .. ." R. MILLAR, supra note 7, at 289.
[Vol. 69
HeinOnline  -- 69 Ky. L.J. 274 1980-1981
VoiR DimE IN KENTUCKY
dicates that the drafters of the Constitution and Bill of Rights
intended the terms "trial by jury" in article III and "impartial
tribunal" in the sixth amendment to include the right of chal-
lenge in felony cases.11 In 1807 Chief Justice John Marshall,
presiding over the treason trial of Aaron Burr, ruled that
questioning of jurors prior to challenge to discover prejudice
was proper. 12 Partly as a result of this notorious case, prelimi-
nary questioning of jurors prior to challenge was a generally
accepted right of parties 3 by the early nineteenth century.
II. THE HISTORY OF VoIR DIRE IN KENTUCKY
A. Challenges
In December 1796, the Kentucky General Assembly en-
acted rudimentary criminal and civil codes. 4 The civil code
did not provide peremptory challenges; the criminal code ac-
corded those accused of felonies twenty peremptory chal-
lenges 5 but granted no reciprocal right to the Commonwealth.
The codes were silent on voir dire and challenges for cause,
but early cases indicate that Kentucky courts recognized chal-
lenges for both actual' and implied17 bias.
In 1798 the General Assembly granted peremptory chal-
lenges to those accused of misdemeanors18 and in 1806 gave
1 Gutman, supra note 8, at 296-99.
2 R. MmLAR, supra note 7, at 292-93; Gutman, supra note 8, at 305-07.
13 R. MILLAR, supra note 7, at 292; Gutman, supra note 8, at 307.
1" Act of Dec. 17, 1796, BRADFORD'S LAwS OF KENTUCKY 192-206 (1799); Act of
Dec. 19, 1796, BRADFORD'S LAWS OF KENTucKY 216-29 (1799). Section 56 of the Dec.
17, 1796 Act (criminal code) and § 32 of the Dec. 19, 1796 Act (civil code), both state:
"Jurors knowing anything relative to the point in issue shall disclose the same in
open court." These provisions probably were intended to insure that jurors were com-
petent witnesses rather than to give the parties a right to inquire into the jurors'
knowledge of the facts.
" Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 19, BRADFORD's LAws OF KENTUCKY 195 (1799).
6 Pierce v. Bush, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 347 (1814) (Court of Appeals ordered a new
trial where the juror declared that his mind was settled against the defendant prior to
the trial).
17 Dailey v. Gaines, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 529 (1833) (new trial ordered where juror
was the plaintiff's uncle by marriage); Hemdon v. Bradshaw, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 45 (1815)
(new trial ordered where juror had sat on previous trial of case).
" Act of Dec. 22, 1798, 1 MoREHF.AD & BROWN'S COMPATION OF KENTUCKY LAWS
533 (1834).
1980-81]
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civil litigants the right to challenge peremptorily one-fourth of
the jury summoned.19 The Commonwealth was not granted
peremptory challenges in criminal cases until 1854. In that
year the legislature enacted a comprehensive criminal practice
code that provided five peremptories for the Commonwealth
and twenty for the defendant in felony cases; in misdemeanor
cases, each side was granted three peremptory challenges.2 0
B. Voir Dire
Litigants in Kentucky courts in the early nineteenth cen-
tury almost certainly had the right to voir dire jurors to dis-
cover actual and implied bias; these concepts of bias were in
fact codified in the Criminal Code of 1854.21 In 1825 the Gen-
19 Act of Dec. 27, 1806, § 1, 2 MOREHEAD & BROWN'S COMPMATION OF KENTUCKY
LAWS 884 (1834).
20 CraM. CODE OF PRACTICE, §§ 204 & 205 (Myers ed. 1867). Walston v. Common-
wealth, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 13 (1855) held that the provision in the 1854 code grant-
ing peremptory challenges to the Commonwealth was not an ex post facto law. This
holding clearly implies that the Commonwealth had no such right prior to 1854.
21 CraM. CODE OF PRACTICE, §§ 210 & 211 (1854) provided:
Sec. 210. Actual bias defined. Actual bias is the existence of such a state of
mind on the part of the juror, in regard to the case or to either party, as
satisfies the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he can not try
the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging.
211. What constitutes implied bias. A challenge for implied bias may be
taken, 1. Where the juror is related by consanguinity, or aflinity, or stands
in relation of guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and servant,
landlord and tenant, employer and employed on wages, or is a member of
the family of the defendant, or of the person alleged to be injured by the
offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instigated.
2. Being adverse to the defendant in a civil suit, or having complained
against, or been accused by him, in a criminal prosecution.
3. Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment, or on the
coroner's jury which inquired into the death of the party, whose death is
the subject to the indictment.
4. Having served on a trial jury, which has tried another person for the
offense charged in the indictment.
5. Having been one of a former jury sworn to try the same indictment, and
whose verdict was set aside, or who were discharged without a verdict.
6. Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant
for the act charged in the indictment.
7. When the offense is punishable with death, the entertaining of such con-
scientious opinion as would preclude him from finding the defendant guilty.
With only a slight modification in 1888, these provisions were in effect until the adop-
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eral Assembly provided that "the Commonwealth shall have
the same right to interrogate a venireman ... relative to his
qualifications, as the prisoner now has, 2 the implication be-
ing that the "prisoner" enjoyed the right of voir dire before
1825. An 1827 statute required judges to disqualify prejudiced
jurors,23 implying that interrogation to discover prejudice was
a common practice.
C. Attorney Questioning
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, litigants
clearly had assumed the right to interrogate prospective jurors
prior to exercising their challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges.24 An 1890 case demonstrates that attorneys, not
judges, generally did the questioning. In London and Lanca-
shire Fire Insurance Co. v. Rufer's Adm'r,25 the trial judge
had conducted the voir dire and had denied counsel the op-
portunity to ask questions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment because counsel could not point to any specific
prejudice; however, the Court said the trial judge should have
permitted questioning by counsel."6 Thus, the standard voir
dire at the turn of the century was one in which attorneys did
most of the questioning.
tion of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1962.
" Act of Jan. 12, 1825, § 6, 1 MOREHEAD & BROWN'S COMPILATION OF KENTUCKY
LAWS 543 (1834).
29 Act of Jan. 22, 1827, 2 MOREHEAD & BROWN'S COMPILATION OF KENTUCKY LAWS
885 (1834).
" Apkins v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W. 376 (Ky. 1912). Apkins construed § 213 of
the Criminal Code of 1854 as granting the accused the right to question the jurors
individually. The Court clearly misconstrued that section, for it provided only that a
juror may be examined under oath by either party upon challenge. The 1854 Act had
been passed as a result of an identical English act designed to codify the restrictive
English practice of questioning after the challenge. R. MmLA, supra note 8, at 290.
Despite the misconstruction of § 213, Apkins remained the law until the passage of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1962. See Woodford v. Commonwealth, 376
S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1964).
25 89 Ky. 525 (1890).
26 Id. at 527-28.
1980-81]
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I1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VoIR DIRE AND ACTUAL
AND IMPLIED BIAS
A. Actual Bias
One purpose of voir dire is to discover bias, either actual
or implied, that will support a challenge for cause. Actual bias
is shown by the juror's statements against the parties or the
cause. 7 If the judge determines from statements during voir
dire or from a previously expressed opinion that a prospective
juror will be actually biased, the juror should be excused at
the request of the party potentially aggrieved. 28 The determi-
nation of actual bias is within the inherent discretion of the
trial court.29
B. Implied Bias
Implied bias, on the other hand, exists whenever the cir-
cumstances are such that partiality is implied by law,3" with-
out proof that the juror is in fact biased.3 1 Bias is implied by
law to preserve the appearance, as much as the fact, of impar-
tiality.32 Section 211 of the Criminal Code of 1854 codified the
grounds of implied bias;33 the Civil Code did not, leaving the
Court of Appeals free in civil cases to say that a particular
relationship was or was not one from which bias would be im-
plied.34 Even in criminal cases from 1854 to 1962, the codifica-
tion in section 211 was not viewed as exclusive, and other cir-
cumstances and relationships were deemed to give rise to
implied bias.35 Section 211 was repealed with the adoption of
27 Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1958).
21 Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.36 (1) (1979).
29 Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Ky. 1978); Polk v. Common-
wealth, 574 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (no error in trial court's refusal to excuse
juror who mistakenly thought defendant previously had robbed his father).
11 Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.2d 984, 989 (1949).
91 47 Am. Jun. 2D Jury § 269 (1969).
92 See, e.g., Hays v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1970) (trial court com-
mitted reversible error in refusing to excuse the sheriff's brother as juror where the
sheriff was the prosecutor's witness, despite the juror's claim that he could be
impartial).
3 See note 21 supra for the text of § 211.
Halleron v. Carrithers Creamery, 239 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1951).
Tayloe v. Commonwealth, 335 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1960); Pennington v. Common-
[Vol. 69
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the criminal rules in 1962, and the present Rule of Criminal
Procedure on point merely states: "When there is reasonable
ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair
and impartial verdict on the evidence, he shall be excused as
not qualified."3' This rule vests discretion in the trial court to
imply bias from particular relationships or circumstances, 37
subject to review by the appellate court. Standards for the ex-
ercise of this discretion can be found in appellate opinions
that have focused on particular relationships and circum-
stances. The civil rules likewise do not define actual or im-
plied bias, nor do they set out grounds for challenge; however,
the cases indicate that the treatment in civil cases should be
the same as under Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.36.
8
The circumstances and relationships which will give rise
to implied bias are relatively certain. Section 211 of the Crim-
inal Code listed the following:39
(1) relationship by consanguinity or affinity to the accused
or the victim;
(2) relationship between the juror and accused or victim of
guardian and ward, attorney and client, landlord and tenant,
employer and employee;
(3) whether the juror had been adverse to the defendant in
a civil or criminal action;
(4) whether the juror had served on the coroner's jury
which inquired into the cause of death or the grand jury
which indicted the defendant;
(5) whether the juror had served on a jury which had tried
another person for the offense;
(6) whether the juror had been on a former jury which had
tried the defendant for the offenses;
wealth, 316 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1958) (juror who was the prosecuting witness's first
cousin should have been excused, notwithstanding the absence of a provision in §
211).
" Ky. R. Cram. P. 9.36 (1) (1979).
37 Watson v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1968).
"Commonwealth v. Hall, 258 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1953); Halleron v. Carrithers
Creamery, 239 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1951). The Kentucky Court of Appeals has declared
that in civil cases the right to a fair and impartial verdict is fundamental. "It inheres
in the woof and warp of the jury system itself ... " Butler v. Commonwealth, 387
S.W.2d 867, 868 (Ky. 1965).
9 CRIM. CODE OF PRACTICE, § 211 (1854).
1980-81]
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(7) whether the juror had served as a juror in a civil action
brought against the defendant for the acts charged in the
indictment; and
(8) when the offense is punishable with death, whether the
juror entertains such conscientious opinions as would pre-
clude the juror from finding the defendant guilty.
Presently, all but the first and last of these statutory
grounds will give rise to bias implied at law.40 The first
ground, relationship by blood or marriage to the accused or
victim, would today give rise to implied bias only when the
relationship is such that a reasonable inference is that the ju-
ror would find it hard to be fair.41 The trial court undoubtedly
has considerable discretion in this matter. The last ground,
conscientious opposition to the death penalty, is available
only when the juror states that under no set of facts could he
vote for the death penalty.42 Additionally, the Kentucky
courts have held that bias will be implied when a juror is a
stockholder of a corporation that is a party" but not when the
juror is a taxpayer of a municipality that is a party.44 Whether
bias should be implied because of an acquaintance or business
relationship is within the discretion of the trial court.4
Although the trial court has wide discretion in determin-
ing the existence of actual or implied bias, the court clearly
must permit voir dire on subjects where the juror's answer
might disclose grounds for challenge for cause. Take the fol-
lowing by way of example. In an automobile accident case,
plaintiff's counsel seeks to ask prospective jurors whether any
of them has been sued as a result of an auto accident.46 The
juror's answer might reveal actual bias against those who sue,
or might reflect a proximity of time or similarity of events
such that the judge would conclude that the juror should not
40 See Commonwealth v. Ginsberg, 516 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. 1974).
4'1 Halleron v. Carrithers Creamery, 239 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1951).
42 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). This case was applied by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1971).
4' Hess Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 61 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1933).
44 City of Pikesville v. Riddle, 230 S.W. 37 (Ky. 1921).
41 Stone v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1010 (1968); Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
4' Drury v. Franke, 57 S.W.2d 969, 984 (1933).
[Vol. 69
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sit if challenged (implying bias to the juror). Since it is impos-
sible to know in advance whether the answers will reveal bias,
the judge is obligated to ask, or permit counsel to ask, the
question.47 Thus, as a general rule, the trial judge must per-
mit voir dire on any subject in which the answers might rea-
sonably reveal actual or implied bias.
The Kentucky courts have stated repeatedly that a legiti-
mate goal of voir dire is to obtain information to exercise per-
emptories more effectively.48 The trial court, however, has dis-
cretion to disallow inquiry when the question does not
directly seek the existence of actual or implied bias.49 An at-
torney probing indirectly for bias or seeking information
about jurors from which to generalize about the jurors' atti-
tudes toward the parties or the case is subject to the court's
discretion. 50 Thus, a second rule can be stated: it is within the
trial court's discretion to allow or disallow a question which
on its face does not seek evidence of actual bias or does not
ask for facts from which bias may be implied. Since the Ken-
tucky high court has recognized the legitimate relationship
between voir dire and peremptory challenges, this discretion
generally should be exercised in favor of permitting the
questioning.
47 The Kentucky appellate courts, in their supervisory capacity, should reverse a
trial court when it does not permit such inquiry. The United States Supreme Court
has been reluctant to hold that restrictions on voir dire constitute a denial of the
accused's right to a fair trial. In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), the Court held
that the trial court's refusal to permit voir dire about racial prejudices in the trial of a
black man accused of robbing a white man was not a constitutional violation. In ef-
fect, the Court placed the burden on the defendant to show that the question would
have revealed bias.
48 Lightfoot v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.2d 984, 989 (Ky. 1949); Olympic Realty
Co. v. Kamer, 141 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Ky. 1940); Drury v. Franke, 57 S.W.2d 969, 984
(Ky. 1933).
"' Murrell v. Spillman, 442 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1969); Farmer v. Pearl, 415 S.W.2d
358 (Ky. 1967).
" See Farrow v. Cundiff, 383 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1964) and Temperly v. Sar-
rington's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1956) for illustrations of the extent of the trial
court's discretion. In Temperly the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, which
had permitted the plaintiff's counsel to ask the jurors whether they had scruples or
objections against returning a verdict for the full amount if the evidence justified it.
In Farrow the trial court refused to permit a plaintiff to ask the question asked in
Temperly; however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision as being within the
trial court's discretion.
1980-81]
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IV. THE INTERESTS OF THE ATTORNEY, JUDGE AND JUROR
While it is generally agreed that the legitimate purpose of
voir dire is to uncover bias, there is little agreement over such
important matters as: 1) the respective roles of judge and at-
torney in voir dire; 2) individual and sequestered questioning;
and 3) the parameters of proper questioning. To understand
the controversy it is helpful to analyze the interests of attor-
ney, judge and juror in the voir dire process.
A. The Attorney
Assume an able, seasoned litigator who will investigate
the jury panel as thoroughly as time and resources permit."1
He will make preliminary judgments regarding the jurors'
suitability based on an analysis of the jurors' potential charac-
teristics and the characteristics of the case.12 The attorney will
Trial manuals recommend such investigation where feasible. R. KEETON, TRIAL
TACTICS AND METHODS, 252-53 (1973); I. GOLDSTEIN & F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL
TECHNIQUES, § 9.06 (1969).
A publication of the National Jury Project and National Lawyers Guild recom-
mends a "community network" to provide information about prospective jurors. D.
KAmYs, JURY SYSTEM: NEw METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE, 36-38 (1975). Re-
cently, much attention has focused on the use of social scientists in preparing profiles
of good and bad jurors, based on demographic and attitudinal studies of the commu-
nity from which the jury is to be drawn. Such studies were employed in conjunction
with pre-trial investigations of cases involving the Berrigan Brothers, Angela Davis,
John Mitchell, and Maurice Stans. Id. at 33-35. See also Frederick, Jury Behavior: A
Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 Omo N. L. REv. 571, 578 (1978); Saks, The
Limits of Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17 JuRIu rmcs J. 3
(1976); Schulman, Recipe for a Fair Jury, PSYCH. TODAY, May 1973, at 37-44; Note,
The Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury and the Rights of Prospective Jurors,
48 U. CmN. L. REV. 985, 991-94 (1979).
" Lawyers are instructed to grade jurors first on the probability of favorable
identification with the client or the cause. J. JEANS, TRIAL ADvOCACY, 172-73 (1975);
T. MAugrr, FUNDAmNTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES, 32-33 (1980). A second approach
focuses on personality types and gives special attention to the "authoritarian juror."
Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality, 1968
Wis. L. REv. 734; Colson, My Approach to Jury Selection for the Plaintiff, AP-
PROACHES TO ADVOCACY, 11-15 (G. Holmes ed. 1973); Frederick, supra note 51, at 581-
83. Finally, the lawyer can fall back on ethnic, age, race and sex stereotypes. I. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 51, § 9.29. A humorous exposition of the latter approach was writ-
ten by Clarence Darrow.
If a Presbyterian enters the jury box, carefully rolls up his umbrella, and
calmly and critically sits down, let him go. He is cold as the grave; he knows
right from wrong, although he seldom finds anything right. He believes in
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view voir dire as an opportunity: 1) to reevaluate the jurors
after seeing and hearing them in the courtroom; 2) to ingrati-
ate himself with the jurors; and 3) to condition the jury for his
theory of the case.53 While only the first goal is legitimate, one
commentator estimates that attorneys spend eighty percent of
their voir dire time attempting to indoctrinate and ingratiate
themselves with the jury and only twenty percent asking
questions to screen the favorable from the unfavorable.5
Thus, the attorney may view voir dire as a time for solicitous
statements or argument in the form of rhetorical questions.
The potential for conflict with the judge is obvious.
Most attorneys undoubtedly would say they do use infor-
mation obtained during voir dire in exercising challenges,
though a sense of fatalism does exist among the trial bar.55
The able attorney, seeking to use voir dire to elicit informa-
tion, may believe that jurors will not volunteer bias or divulge
information that the juror believes will result in his being
stricken.5 6 Accepting these premises, the attorney feels that
John Calvin and eternal punishment. Get rid of him with the fewest possi-
ble words before he contaminates the others; unless you and your clients
are Presbyterians you probably are a bad lot, and even though you may be
a Presbyterian, your client most likely is guilty. If possible, the Baptists are
more hopeless than the Presbyterians. They, too, are apt to think that the
real home of all outsiders is Sheol, and you do not want them on the jury,
and the sooner they leave the better.
The Methodists are worth considering; they are nearer the soil. Their
religious emotions can be transmuted into love and charity. They are not
half bad, even though they will not take a drink; they really do not need it
so much as some of their competitors for the seat next to the throne. If
chance sets you down between a Methodist and a Baptist, you will move
toward the Methodist to keep warm.
J. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY, 170 (1975).
53 I. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 51, at §§ 9.33-.74; J. JEANS, supra note 52, at 178,
191; T. MAumr, FuNDAnmENrALs OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 37 (1980); and A. MORRILL,
TRIuL DIPLOMACY 6-14 (1975). Excess usage of the trial manuals' advice has contrib-
uted to judge-conducted voir dires. Maxwell, The Case of the Rebellious Juror, 56
A.B.A.J. 838, 842 (1970).
' Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv.
503, 522 (1965).
55 Id. at 507.
" Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545,
548-49 (1975); Kerig, Perceptions from a Jury Box, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 306, 307-08
(1979). See Broeder, supra note 54, at 510-14 for illustrations of the jurors' lack of
candor.
1980-81]
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questioning will be effective only if: 1) conducted by him
rather than by the judge;57 2) individual rather than to the
panel; 58 and 3) indirect rather than direct.59 Indirect and per-
sistent questioning is considered essential to reveal uncon-
scious bias. 0 The attorney pressing for individual, somewhat
rambling voir dire is probably one who fashions himself
skilled (perhaps with the aid of a psychologist in attendance)
in deciphering body language.61 The attorney who believes in
body language wants to be face-to-face with a juror, asking
57 Babcock, supra note 56, at 545; Gutman, supra note 8, at 303; Note, The Jury
Voir Dire: Useless Delays of Valuable Technique, 11 S. DAK. L. REv. 306, 318 (1966);
Note, Voir Dire in Federal Criminals Trials: Protecting the Defendant's Right to an
Impartial Jury, 48 IND. L. J. 269, 276 (1973).
" D. KAIRYS, supra note 51, at 28; Comment, State v. Manley, 1969 VILL. L.
REV. 214, 221; Comment, Voir Dire in California Criminal Trials: Where is it Going?
Where Should it Go? 10 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 395, 408 (1973).
61 Babcock, supra note 56, at 548-49; Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum
Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv.
1493, 1508-09 (1975). Babcock relates the need for indirect questioning to the superi-
ority of attorney-conducted voir dire.
Thus, for instance, when a potential juror responds that she has been the
victim of a crime, the judge will typically ask whether this would tend to
prejudice her in evaluating the testimony to be given in the case. An attor-
ney conducting the voir dire would probe the nature of the crime, her eval-
uation of the police investigation and conduct toward her, whether she
made an identification and testified in court. Such questions spring to the
mind of the advocate, but would occur less often to the judge. This is true
partly because the judge does not want to spend time asking the questions,
partly because he does not have the advocate's awareness that soon he will
be making peremptory challenges based on inferences from what prospec-
tive jurors have said, and partly because the judge does not know the case
of either party in detail, so that he cannot realize when responses have
opened areas for further inquiry.
Babcock, supra note 56, at 548-49.
60 See Levitt, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical
Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 916, 951-53 (1971), for an excellent example of persistent
questioning before a very tolerant judge. This interrogation was praised in Note,
supra note 59, at 1508.
"I F. BAILEY, & H. ROTHBLATr, SuccEsSFuL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRLus,
104 (1971); G. NIERENBERG, & H. CALERo, How TO READ A PERSON LIm A BoOK
(1971). The basic assumption is that feelings and attitudes are communicated prima-
rily by paralinguistic and kinesic responses. Paralinguistic responses are how a person
speaks-pitch and tone, emphasis, pauses and disturbances; kinesic responses include
eye contact, body movement and orientation, and facial expression. A trained psy-
chologist may purport to intelligently rate a juror's acceptability by observing his
kinesic and paralinguistic responses to judge and counsel. Frederick, Jury Behavior:
A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 OHio N. L. REv. 571, 583-84 (1978).
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non-obvious questions to elicit involuntary body responses;
rarely can he pass judgment on the attitude of jurors toward
himself or his client from a position at counsel table listening
to the judge question the panel.
B. The Judge
While the attorney almost certainly views voir dire as
part of the adversarial process, the experienced judge will
likely regard voir dire as preliminary to the adversarial trial.
From the judge's viewpoint, voir dire's purpose is to obtain
the most impartial jury possible.2 The judge will regard as
improper efforts of attorneys to ingratiate themselves with
and indoctrinate the jurors.6 s Further, the judge probably will
regard as ineffectual attempts by counsel to identify unfavor-
able jurors. His experience as judge and lawyer will have led
him to believe jurors to be unpredictable and the likelihood of
improving a jury by challenge to be problematic.4
62 G. BERMANT, CoNDucr OF THE Vom DIRE EXAMINATION; PRACTICES AND OPIN-
IONS OF FEDERAL DISTRmIT JUDGES, 17-19 (1977).
6 People v. Crowe, 506 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1973); State v. Manley, 255 A.2d 193,
205 (N.J. 1969).
"The leading empirical study strongly supports this position. Hans Zeisel and
Shari Diamond conducted an experiment in a federal court in Chicago in which
struck jurors listened to the evidence and returned verdicts. The struck jurors' votes
were compared with the verdicts of the actual juries. Although the results are not
statistically valid because of the limited number of trials, the general conclusion is
that the attorneys performed poorly and erratically in exercising challenges. The
prosecutors collectively did not improve the jury at all, while defense attorneys' per-
formances were only slightly better. Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect-of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30
STAN. L. REV. 491, 517 (1978).
Broeder reached the same conclusion in his earlier study in which he interviewed
225 jurors sitting on 23 cases in a midwestern federal district court over an 18-month
period. He found voir dire and the exercise of challenges to be ineffective in eliminat-
ing unfavorable jurors. He cites many examples in which extremely partial jurors
were not struck. Broeder, supra note 54, at 505-20. He concluded:
The message here is exceedingly clear. Voir Dire was grossly ineffective not
only in weeding out "unfavorable" jurors but even in eliciting the data
which would have shown particular jurors as very likely to prove "unfavor-
able.".. . As an institution for sifting out "unfavorable" jurors, voir dire
cannot be effective. A lawyer simply cannot anticipate many of the factors
in the jurors' backgrounds which will affect their thinking and there is a
broad area in which perspicacity would not help anyway. Legal rules pre-
clude many questions and other questions cannot be asked because of the
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Since he is both neutral and an authority figure, the judge
may feel that jurors will more candidly respond to his ques-
tions than to those of the obviously partisan attorneys, a ra-
tionale which supports judge-conducted voir dire.s, At the
same time the judge will resist attorneys' efforts to show ac-
tual bias on the part of jurors, because a challenge for actual
bias carries moral condemnation that a challenge for implied
bias lacks."' Thus, the judge may intervene to "save" jurors
after counsel seemingly has established actual bias.67 Finally,
the judge will be conscious of his own time constraints and
will be interested in expediting jury selection.6s Indirect and
time-consuming questions may result in the judge terminating
danger of offending. Again, veniremen do not always tell the truth when
questioned. The data contain numerous instances of conscious concealment
and lack of candor.
Id. at 505-06.
Levitt, supra note 60, at 950-53.
Babcock identifies reasons why judges are correct not to find actual bias ex-
cept in the most obvious cases: (1) judges should not be forced to imply that a person
who promises to be fair will not be fair; (2) the lack of certainty about unconscious
biases make a judge's decision to excuse a juror for cause difficult to support when
the juror has not admitted bias; and (3) permitting challenges for cause based on
group associations would undermine the principles of community representation and
democratic government. Babcock, supra note 56, at 1500-01.
67 See Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 40 S.W.2d 356 (Ky. 1931), for a
classic example of such an intervention. The issue was whether a bus company had
wrongfully refused passage to a black woman. Plaintiff's counsel asked the jurors
whether they believed blacks should ride with whites. Not surprisingly, a number said
they did not. At this point, the trial court asked the following question:
In the event the court should instruct the jury that colored persons includ-
ing the appellant had under the law a right to ride on defendant's bus at
the same time white persons were riding, and this being the law of the case
could you and would you follow the law in this respect as given by the court
and would you wholly disregard your private opinion as to the rights of the
plaintiff to ride on the bus with white people and try the case according to
the law as given by the court?
Id. at 360. Despite the judge's attempt to save these jurors, several of them admitted
that they could not abide by the court's instructions and were excused.
"There is some evidence that judge-conducted voir dire is quicker. Judicial
Conference Committee on the Operations of the Jury System, The Jury System in
Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 467-68 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Conference
Committee]. See Levitt, supra note 60, at 947-48, which states that the average
judge-conducted voir dire lasts 64 minutes and the average mixed judge/attorney-
conducted voir dire lasts 111 minutes. Attorneys, however, probably restrict their
questioning whenever the judge appears irritated by lengthy voir dire. Broeder, supra
note 54, at 505.
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or taking over the questioning.
C. The Juror
Along with the judge and attorney, the juror has impor-
tant interests in the voir dire process. After being called from
his job and kept waiting on a hard bench for half the morning,
the juror is finally called to the box, where he becomes a wit-
ness, under oath and without the assistance of counsel, an-
swering questions in a case in which he is a stranger. After
responding to inquiries that often seem irrelevant or overly
personal, he is not selected for reasons unknown. The juror
does not know whether he was peremptorily challenged or was
not selected by luck of the draw. 9 If he suspects the former,
he is resentful, because he wanted to serve and feels he would
have been fair.
Jurors consider their time valuable and may resent pro-
tracted voir dire questioning.70 Further, jurors may resent be-
ing singled out and required to speak in front of strangers,7 1
particularly if the question demands personal information. 2
Dwan Kerig, a professor at San Diego University School of
Law, wrote of his recent experience as a juror in San Diego
County:
I saw two venirepersons become emotional in responding to
counsel's questions about the psychiatric treatment each
had received. A "good" (from a clinical attorney's point of
view) voir dire probes deeper than any venireperson wishes.
However, I do not think that the venireperson resents the
attorney's probing, rather he/she just wishes that so many
voyeurs were not present during the probing .... Undress-
ing before medical attendants is easy but not before other
patients too.7"
11 Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.02 (1979) and Ky. R. Cam. P. 9.32 (1979) provide means for
dismissing a juror without informing him if he was challenged.
70 Broeder, supra note 54, at 526.
71 Id.
7 See Maxwell, supra note 53, at 838, where the commentator hypothesized a
case in which a juror refused to say whether he or his wife ever were members of an
activist group. The juror was held in contempt and imprisoned; ultimately the con-
tempt citation was overturned by the United States Supreme Court.
73 Kerig, Perceptions from a Jury Box, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 306, 307 (1979).
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A juror will certainly resent any implication that he can-
not be fair and will resent what appear to be meritless chal-
lenges to his fellows. 4
D. The Conflicting Interests
Apply this interest analysis to the issues identified at the
beginning of this section and the conflict is apparent. The first
issue is the role of the attorney in voir dire. The attorney will
seek to ask most of the questions, while the judge may see a
judge-dominated voir dire as of equal or greater effectiveness,
taking less time and without possibility of ingratiation or in-
doctrination. The juror probably does not care who asks the
questions but does prefer that the process take as little time
as possible.
The second issue is whether individual questioning
should be permitted. Assuming that jurors will not volunteer
information, the attorney presses for individual questioning in
order to force jurors to respond. The juror prefers not to be
questioned individually; however, if there is to be individual
questioning on sensitive matters, he prefers that it be done
privately. Conscious of the time involved, the judge may or
may not be receptive to individual questioning.
The final issue involves the parameters of proper ques-
tioning. The attorney will seek the widest possible latitude,
and this will be resented by the judge, unimpressed with the
efficacy of indirect questioning and suspecting disguised in-
doctrination. The juror will resent personal, seemingly irrele-
vant questioning that prolongs voir dire.
Take, as an example, voir dire on the defense of in-
sanity.75 Seeking sympathetic jurors, the defense attorney
wants to sit privately with each prospective juror and find out
whether mental illness has afflicted any member of that ju-
ror's family. The juror would prefer not to be questioned at all
on such matters; if such questioning is to occur, however, he
would like it to be done privately. The judge is skeptical
74 Broeder, supra note 54, at 526.
71 See Brundage v. United States, 365 F.2d 616, 618 (10th Cir. 1966) for an anal-
ysis of voir dire on the insanity defense.
[Vol. 69
HeinOnline  -- 69 Ky. L.J. 288 1980-1981
Vom D=RE IN KENTUCKY
about the relationship between a family history of mental ill-
ness and sympathy toward the insanity defense. He suspects
the defense attorney of indoctrination and believes this type
of inquiry to be too time-consuming. Since discretion is lodg-
ed in the trial court, the judge's view will prevail. Each of the
three positions, however, is tenable.
V. SURVEY OF KENTUCKY CIRCUIT JUDGES
A. Background of this Study
There has been no previous systematic study of voir dire
practices in Kentucky circuit courts. A report of a 1964 semi-
nar, however, contained the following conclusions:
The Voir Dire: Mechanics
The Kentucky practice, which follows the federal rules,
presumably would allow the trial judge to conduct the voir
dire to the exclusion of the trial attorneys, with the attor-
neys being forced to make specific requests to the judge for
him to ask questions of the jurors. However, the overwhelm-
ing sentiment and philosophy of the judges was to "let the
lawyers try the case." Most of the judges do ask some pre-
liminary questions of the jury and then turn the voir dire
over to the attorneys. Generally they require the lawyers to
address the panel as a whole in civil cases, but do not in
criminal cases. The judges stated that they control the voir
dire at all times under the primary test of whether the law-
yer's conduct is consuming an undue amount of time. The
general observation was that the Kentucky attorneys did not
abuse the voir dire by lengthy questioning. The idea was
promoted that formal biographical questionnaires should be
filled out in advance by each prospective juror and should be
made available to the lawyers in order to eliminate some of
the questioning on voir dire. A poll of the judges indicated
that none were following this procedure, though some judges
have their clerks fill in basic biographical data for use by the
attorneys. It seems to be an unknown factor the degree to
which prospective jurors' backgrounds and privacy are sub-
jected to scrutiny by professional investigators who report
their findings to the attorneys. The overall question was
posed as to what effect these practices might have upon the
jurors' attitude toward the judge, attorneys and parties to a
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law suit. To the extent that this is or may become a prob-
lem, formalized questionnaires may help in minimizing it.
Voir Dire: Content of Questions
As to the proper limitations upon the content of ques-
tions that could be asked upon voir dire, there was no sub-
stantial agreement. The general sentiment, however, seemed
to run in favor of the Illinois rule prohibiting questions on
specific elements of law or evidence to be adduced in that
case, though some dissented from this view. Again there was
substantial agreement against allowing what was termed
"Belli-type questions." However, when confronted with a
concrete case, the judges were divided as to the propriety of
voir dire questioning of the juror about his feelings toward
the proper amount of damages. This question was posed in
the 1963 West Virginia case of Thornsbury v. Thornsbury
where in an automobile case for wrongful death, plaintiff's
counsel propounded to the jury this question: "Should the
evidence disclose to you and you should be of the opinion
that the plaintiff is entitled to win, entitled to recovery, do
you feel that 25,000 dollars is too much for the death of a
sixteen year old girl?" The trial court refused to allow the
question and the appellate court affirmed it on this point on
the theory that the question made no contribution to accom-
plishing a fair trial or to the proper administration of
justice.
76
7' Kennedy, Judge-Jury-Counsel Relations in Kentucky, 54 Ky. L.J. 243, 246-47
(1966). The suggestion in the 1964 report that biographical questionnaires be utilized
has been implemented. In 1976 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a law requir-
ing summoned jurors to complete and return to the court a combination summons
and qualification form. Unless otherwise directed by the court, this form is made
available to the parties or their attorneys. Ky. Pnv. STAT. § 29A.070(6) (1977) [herein-
after cited as KRS]. The form, prepared by the Administrative Office of Courts,
tracks the juror qualification statute. See Form AOC-77-401 [appendix 1 herein]. The
form also solicits information that does not relate to juror qualification but that may
be of interest to attorneys during the selection process. The juror qualification statute
provides:
(1) The chief circuit judge or another judge designated by him shall deter-
mine on the basis of the information provided on the juror qualification
form whether the prospective juror is disqualified for jury service for any of
the reasons listed in subsection 2 of this section. He shall enter this deter-
mination in the space provided on the juror qualification form and on the
list of names drawn from the jury wheeL The chief circuit judge shall cause
each disqualified juror to be immediately notified of his disqualification.
(2) A prospective juror is disqualified to serve on a jury if he:
[Vol. 69
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As the above remarks indicate, judicial attitudes toward
voir dire are divergent. In light of the fact that the mechan-
ics1 7 and content" of voir dire are inherently within the dis-
cretion of the trial courts, an awareness of how that discretion
is being exercised should benefit both judges and attorneys. A
judge from one circuit may take a hands-off attitude, permit-
ting the attorneys to ask most of the questions and exercising
little control over the content of the questions. A judge from
another circuit, on the other handjmay ask all the questions
and require counsel to demonstrate that a proposed question
bears directly on a showing of actual or implied bias. This sur-
vey was undertaken to analyze voir dire practices in the state,
to share that analysis with the bench and bar, and to make
recommendations to guide the discretion of the trial courts.
The survey consisted of a comprehensive questionnaire" that
was sent to all circuit judges in the state. Of Kentucky's
eighty-seven circuit judges, sixty-seven completed the ques-
tionnaire. Follow-up interviews were conducted with fifteen
randomly-selected judges. It is hoped that presentation of the
survey's results, along with the author's recommendations,
will aid in the administration of this important aspect of the
(a) Is not a citizen of the United States; or
(b) Is not a resident of the county; or
(c) Is unable to speak and understand the English language; or
(d) Is incapable, by reason of his physical or mental disability,
of rendering effective jury service; or
(e) Has been previously convicted of a felony and has not been
pardoned by the governor or other authorized person of the juris-
diction in which he was convicted; or
(f) Is presently under indictment; or
(g) Has served on a jury within the past twelve (12) months.
(3) There shall be no waiver of these disqualifications.
KRS § 29A.080 (1977).
71 Ky. R. Civ. P. 47.01 (1979) and Ky. R. CriM. P. 9.38 (1979) give the judge
control over who asks the questions. Davies v. Griffin, 470 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1971) and
Woodford v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1964) make it clear that the judge
controls individual questioning.
78 Farmer v. Pearl, 415 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1967); Farrow v. Cundiff, 383 S.W.2d
119 (Ky. 1964); Temperly v. Sarrington's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1956).
7, See G. BERMANT, supra note 62, at 5, 13, & 19 for sources of the first three
questions. The author of this article is responsible for the content of the other nine
questions. Professor Ron Dillehay of the University of Kentucky Department of Psy-
chology assisted in the wording of the questions.
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litigation process.
B. Judicial Attitudes
A judge's view of the relationship between voir dire and
the adversary process is an important factor in his exercise of
discretion during voir dire. Table 1 reflects the position held
by Kentucky circuit judges.
Table 1. Voir Dire and Adversarial Advocacy
9.4% (1) The selection of a jury should precede the
beginning of adversarial advocacy. The se-
lection of the jury for a case should be as
independent of the adversary process as is
the selection of the judge for that case.
43.8% (2) Ideally, perhaps, the selection of a jury
should precede the beginning of adversarial
advocacy. For reasons of tradition and to
insure a sense of full participation in the
trial, however, it is wise for the judge to
grant counsel the opportunity to examine
potential jurors, either directly or indi-
rectly.
23.4% (3) The selection of the jury falls properly
within the scope of adversarial advocacy.
Lawyers deserve the right to question each
potential juror, either directly or indirectly.
23.4% (4) Adversarial advocacy is the most effective
means of choosing an impartial jury. Just
as the adversary process is a good method
for arriving at the truth of testimony, so is
it a good method for the selection of impar-
tial jurors.
These results show that almost half of the responding
judges feel that voir dire is properly a part of the adversary
process. Most of the remaining judges (43.8%) view attorney
questioning as wise, in order to ensure a sense of full partici-
pation or out of respect for tradition. Thus, an overwhelming
percentage of judges believes that voir dire, to some extent, is
part of the adversarial process. These views should be con-
[Vol. 69
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trasted with those held by federal district court judges inter-
viewed in 1977. The results of this survey reflect a distinctly
different attitude among federal judges.80
Table la.
56% The selection of a jury should precede the
beginning of adversarial advocacy. The se-
lection of the jury for a case should be as
independent of the adversary process as is
the selection of the judge for that case.
28% Ideally, perhaps, the selection of a jury
should precede the beginning of adversarial
advocacy. For reasons of tradition and to
insure a sense of full participation in the
trial, however, it is wise for the judge to
grant counsel the opportunity to examine
potential jurors, either directly or indi-
rectly.
8% The selection of the jury falls properly
within the scope of adversarial advocacy.
Lawyers deserve the right to question each
potential juror, either directly or indirectly.
5% Adversarial advocacy is the most effective
means of choosing an impartial jury. Just
as the adversary process is a good method
for arriving at the truth of testimony, so is
it a good method for the selection of impar-
tial jurors.
3% No answer.
In the follow-up portion of the survey, judges were asked
if attorneys attempted to influence the jury during voir dire.
Most replied that lawyers would, if they thought they could
get away with it. One judge commented that lawyers exerted
their "main effort to try the case during voir dire." Several
judges said that attorneys shied away from indoctrination
questions only because they knew the judge frowned on such
tactics.
80 Id. at 19.
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Judicial attitudes toward efforts to persuade varied
greatly. Four of the fifteen judges interviewed were tolerant of
attorneys' efforts to persuade; however, one indicated he
would sustain an objection if made. Seven judges deemed such
efforts improper and indicated they would act to curtail at-
tempts to sway the jury. The other four were in the middle;
the impression from the interviews was that these judges gave
attorneys a limited opportunity to persuade.
Additionally, the judges were asked whether lawyers, in
exercising their peremptory challenges, relied primarily on in-
formation from the jury qualification sheets and voir dire or
on information obtained through investigation and indepen-
dent knowledge. The results indicated that attorneys from ur-
ban counties rely on the juror qualification sheets and voir
dire. This is particularly true in Jefferson County, where ju-
rors are drawn from a large pool on the day of the trial.
Judges who sit in primarily rural circuits feel that better law-
yers investigate the panel prior to trial; those lawyers will
then rely on what they have learned prior to voir dire in the
exercise of peremptory strikes. One judge said, "it is essential
to investigate the panel in order to intelligently strike." The
judge was not referring to clandestine surveillance but to the
practice of discussing the jury list with local residents familiar
with the community.
In response to questions about the effectiveness of law-
yers in exercising strikes, the judges indicated that the most
effective attorneys were those who knew or had investigated
the members of the jury panel. The judges were less compli-
mentary of strikes based on the qualification form and voir
dire questoning. Responses included: "plain old toss-up," "far
from an exact science; pretty good on the obvious ones," "you
can't predict what a juror will do," and "as far as selection is
concerned, voir dire does not amount to a hill of beans." Of
course many judges responded that attorney effectiveness
could not be judged, since the way a struck juror would have
voted is unknown. Several judges noted that attorney effec-
tiveness may be judged in terms of the jurors which are otrick-
en by opposing counsel. Under Kentucky's rules of civil and
criminal procedure, attorneys strike from a list of eighteen
[Vol. 69
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persons in civil trials and twenty-five in criminal trials, with-
out knowing the opposing counsel's strikes. Rarely, said these
judges, do attorneys strike the same juror.
The Kentucky circuit judges were polled for their opin-
ions of jurors' candor in responding to group questions. A jury
study in the late 1950's by Dale Broeder of the University of
Chicago had revealed many instances in which pertinent in-
formation was concealed by jurors,81 and in light of the Broe-
der study, the responses to the questionnaire by Kentucky
judges were somewhat surprising.
Table 2. Candor of Jurors: Response to Group Questions
Place a check mark next to the statement that most
clearly approximates your belief as to the candor of prospec-
tive jurors in responding to questions to the panel on voir
dire (not to him individually). The term "non-neutral," as
used here, means any response which might be embarrassing
to the juror or, from the juror's point of view, might cause
him to be rejected.
65.7% 1) Jurors generally volunteer relevant in-
formation, even though non-neutral,
in response to questions put to the
panel.
23.9% 2) Jurors generally do not volunteer rele-
vant non-neutral information in re-
sponse to questions put to the panel,
though juror will generally volunteer
neutral information.
'l Broeder interviewed 225 jurors who had served on 23 cases in a midwestern
federal district court. Broeder found seventeen instances of misconduct in ten trials,
including: a juror who recently had been disfigured in an auto accident but said noth-
ing in response to a general inquiry about involvement in auto accidents; a juror who
had been over-compensated for personal injury and property damage sustained in
collision with defendant's train but who did not reveal this to plaintiff's counsel; a
juror who knew the plaintiff's family well but did not reveal it when the panel was
queried about connections with the parties; and two jurors who both felt that insur-
ance companies should pay regardless of fault and intended to press that view with
the other jurors. Broeder, supra note 54, 510-14.
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10.4% 3) Jurors generally do not volunteer rele-
vant information, neutral or non-neu-
tral, in response to questions put to
the panel.
Two-thirds of the responding Kentucky judges believe ju-
rors candidly answer questions put to the panel, even though
a truthful answer might be embarrassing or cause the juror to
be rejected. Follow-up interviews, however, suggest a qualifi-
cation of this finding. The questionnaire did not ask judges to
distinguish jurors' candor when asked for specific factual in-
formation (e.g., acquaintance with a witness) from their can-
dor when asked for feelings toward a characteristic of the
party or the case (e.g., how jurors feel about people who
drink). When asked to make this distinction, most judges in-
dicated that jurors were honest in disclosing factual informa-
tion but were less forthright when asked about their attitudes.
This conclusion is not surprising. No one is truly neutral, and
it is unrealistic to expect even conscientious jurors to recog-
nize and admit their biases.
Judges feel, however, that most jurors will not deliber-
ately withhold or misrepresent specific facts. Jury orientation
sessions stress the need for candor and often suggest that ju-
rors hold up their hands if there is anything they think should
be brought to the court's attention. In the follow-up inter-
views, some judges noted that jurors were extremely candid
and anxious to discuss even irrelevant matters. Several judges,
however, mentioned the reluctance of their jurors to speak out
before a group. The judges indicated that they attempted to
relieve the jurors' fears by encouraging them to approach the
bench with their concerns. One Jefferson County judge stated
that jurors tend to be more candid with the judge than with
attorneys. Jurors view the judge as a neutral authority figure
and, thus, do not believe the judge will trick or embarrass
them.
C. Voir Dire: The Mechanics
1. Attorney Participation
Despite a feeling among some judges that jurors are more
[Vol. 69
HeinOnline  -- 69 Ky. L.J. 296 1980-1981
VoIR DmE IN KENTUCKY
likely to be candid with judges than with attorneys, the re-
sponses to the questionnaire indicate a willingness to permit
attorneys to examine jurors extensively. The following table
reflects the extent to which circuit judges permit attorneys to
participate in voir dire in criminal and civil cases.
Table 3. Lawyer Participation in Voir Dire
Please place a mark beside the statement that most accu-
rately reflects your usual practice in the conduct of voir dire
examination in typical civil and criminal cases:
Civil Criminal
1.5% 3.0% 1) I conduct the entire examination. I
accept additional questions from
counsel, but I often edit or restate
the questions before asking them.
0% 0% 2) I conduct the entire examination. I
accept questions from counsel and
usually ask them in the form re-
quested.
13.6% 15.2% 3) I conduct an initial examination. I
then allow counsel to supplement
my questions. The questioning of
counsel, however, is pursuant to a
prior understanding between coun-
sel and myself concerning the scope
and duration of the questions.
63.6% 62.1% 4) I conduct an initial examination. I
then give counsel a free hand in the
subsequent questioning of panel
members, though I may intervene
if the questioning becomes irrele-
vant or too long.
12.1% 12.1% 5) I permit counsel to conduct the en-
tire examination following my in-
troductory remarks though I may
intervene if the questioning be-
comes irrelevant or takes too long.
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9.2% 7.6% 6) I permit counsel to conduct the en-
tire examination following my in-
troductory remarks. I rarely inter-
vene in the attorney's voir dire.
0% 0% 7) I am not present during voir dire.
The results reveal an impressive consensus. Three-fourths
of the responding judges conduct an initial examination and
permit attorneys to supplement the court's questions (catego-
ries (3) and (4)). This approach might be termed the Jefferson
County Model since it corresponds to Rule 1804 of the Jeffer-
son Circuit Court. 2 The Jefferson County Model is dominant
" Jefferson County has a local rule requiring the judge to ask certain questions
before the attorneys are permitted to ask questions. Two of the Jefferson circuit
judges interviewed indicated that they did not follow the rule verbatim but instead
used their own questions. The rule provides:
Before the attorneys are permitted to interrogate a jury panel, qualifying
questions, substantially as follows, shall be asked the jury panel by the
court, after stating the names of the parties and the nature of the
controversy.
1. Does any member of the panel know anything about this controversy?
2. Has any one talked to you about this controversy or about it in your
presence?
3. Are you related by blood or marriage to any of the parties (naming
them)?
4. If one of the parties is a corporation, are you an officer, agent, stock-
holder, bondholder or employee of such corporation?
5. Plaintiff's counsel is - Has he, or any member of his firm, been your
attorney for any purpose within the past five years?
6. Defendant's counsel is - Has he, or any member of his firm, been
your attorney for any purpose within the past five years?
7. Have you, or your wife or husband, had a claim for damages, or a claim
similar to the one being asserted herein, against any person, firm or corpo-
ration at any time?
8. (As to any who have had such claims) Would the fact that you have had
such a claim affect your judgment in this case?
9. At any time, has there been brought or made against you, or your wife or
husband, a suit or claim for damages?
10. As to any who have had such a claim or suit against you, or your wife or
husband, would the fact that you have had such a claim or suit against you,
or your wife or husband, affect your judgment in this case?
11. The parties in this case and the court desire that each juror selected to
try this case shall be disinterested and impartial and that the verdict will
reflect the honest opinion and unprejudiced judgment of the jury. Is there
any reason why you cannot give to the consideration of this case your care-
ful attention and by the verdict say what your honest opinion and judg-
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not only in Louisville, where twelve out of thirteen judges em-
ploy it, but in the rest of the state as well. That relatively few
(fourteen of sixty-six) judges permit counsel to conduct the
entire examination is not surprising; to find, however, that
only two judges deny attorneys the right to ask any questions
was unexpected. In contrast, seventy percent of the federal
district judges responding to a similar questionnaire in 1977
indicated they asked all the questions.8 3 Kentucky judges al-
most uniformly give attorneys some opportunity to address
the jury during voir dire, a position adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1968."
2. Length of Voir Dire
Table 4 reflects the average length of voir dire in Ken-
tucky circuit courts and federal district courts. That the esti-
mated durations of voir dire are basically the same supports
the proposition that attorney involvement generally does not
increase the length of voir dire. 5
Table 4. Length of Voir Dire
Please place a mark beside the range of time that most
accurately represents the amount of time usually taken to
ment is?
JEFFERSON CO. CT. R. 1804.
2S G. BERMANT, supra note 62, at 5. This study confirms a trend in federal courts
toward reducing the role of attorneys in voir dire. Judicial Conference Committee,
supra note 68, at 466.
" ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, 2.4 (app. draft 1968).
A voir dire examination should be conducted for the purpose of discov-
ering bases for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge
to enable an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. The judge should
initiate the voir dire examination by identifying the parties and their re-
spective counsel and by briefly outlining the nature of the case. The judge
should then put to the prospective jurors any questions which he thinks
necessary, touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause on
trial. The judge should also permit such additional questions by the defen-
dant or his attorney and the prosecuting attorney as he deems reasonable
and proper.
Id.
85 A 1971 study in Los Angeles found attorney involvement to substantially in-
crease the duration of voir dire. Levitt, supra note 60, at 947-8.
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complete the voir dire examination (including challenges) for
typical civil and criminal cases in your courtroom:
Kentucky Circuit Courts Federal District Courts 8'
(1980) (1977)
Civil Criminal Civil Criminal
36.9% 15.2% 33% 16% Less than thirty minutes
55.4% 62.1% 49% 49% Thirty minutes-one hour
7.7% 21.2% 14% 28% One-two hours
0% 1.5% 1% 5% Two-three hours
0% 0% 0% 2% Three-five hours
0% 0% 0% 0% More than five hours
The difference in the estimated durations of voir dire in
civil and criminal cases is significant. Of the sixty-five Ken-
tucky judges who responded to this question, twenty-six esti-
mated that criminal voir dire took longer (three said civil took
longer, and thirty-six said there was no difference). In follow-
up interviews, the longer criminal voir dire was attributed to
the seriousness of criminal sanctions, to the defense lawyer's
need to guard against later claims of incompetency, to the de-
fense attorney's repetition of reasonable doubt and presump-
tion of innocence, and to defense attempts to find the one per-
son who would hang the jury. Most judges, however, said the
length of voir dire is dependent upon the attorneys and the
case, and that criminal voir dire need not last longer. Several
judges credited the strike list juror selection method of re-
vised Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.36 with expedit-
ing criminal voir dire.
87
3. Role of the Judge in the Absence of Objections
As previously mentioned, almost half of the Kentucky
judges responded that attorney-conducted voir dire is prop-
erly part of the adversary process. This philosophical position
does not prevent those same judges from intervening, sua
sponte, when voir dire becomes tiresome or overly personal.
86 G. BERMANT, supra note 63, at 13.
', The strike method of Rule 9.36 expedites the process because attorneys are no
longer required to exercise their challenges during the questioning of the jurors.
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Table 5 reflects the extent to which Kentucky judges inter-
vene in an attorney's conduct of voir dire in the absence of
objection from the adversary.
Table 5. Voir Dire: Role of the Judge in the Absence of
Objection
6.2% 1) I do not intervene in an attorney's conduct
of voir dire unless the other side objects.
69.2% 2) I intervene in an attorney's conduct of voir
dire in the absence of objection, if it appears
that the attorney is wasting time or is em-
barrassing a juror.
22.3% 3) I intervene in the attorney's conduct of voir
dire, in the absence of objection, whenever
the content or form of the question is such
that an objection would be sustained if
made.
2.3% 4) I conduct the voir dire myself, therefore this
question is inapplicable.
Most judges indicated they would intervene in the ab-
sence of objection only if an attorney were wasting time or
embarrassing a juror. A sizeable minority, however, said they
would intervene whenever a question was objectionable for
any reason. One judge said he would intervene if a juror were
being embarrassed but not if the question were merely preju-
dicial to the other side. Opposing counsel may be relied on to
object if he feels the improper question damages his cause. He
cannot be relied on to object when the question is objection-
able because it infringes on a juror's right of privacy. The ad-
versary system may protect against improper efforts of per-
suasion but cannot be relied on to protect a juror's right of
privacy.
4. Form of Voir Dire: Individual Questioning
One of the most controversial voir dire issues is whether
an attorney should be permitted to single out a juror for ques-
tioning. The attorney will urge that individual questioning is
essential to obtain candid responses. Further, he may use the
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technique of singling out a juror as a prod to get the jurors
talking or as a means to indoctrinate the jury. The judge may
react to protect the jurors or to halt the indoctrination. The
conflict between judge and attorney can be sharp.""
Judges from Kentucky were asked their practice when the
particular question was one that could be put either individu-
ally or to the panel as a whole. The accompanying explanation
was:
A group question is a question to the panel of prospective
jurors. Ordinarily such a question does not demand an indi-
vidual response, though occasionally an attorney will ask a
question to the panel and attempt to elicit answers from
each juror. An example would be for the attorney to ask if
the jurors accepted the proposition that his client was pre-
sumed to be innocent, asking each juror to raise his hand.
An individual question is directed to a specific juror and re-
quires a response of him.
The selections below seek your general practice when the
question is not one that must be asked individually. An ex-
ample of a question that must be asked individually is, "Ju-
ror No. Four, how many children do you have?" An example
of a question which need not be asked individually is, "Have
you been the victim of a burglary?"
The judges' responses show considerable differences.
Table 6. Form of Voir Dire: Individual Questioning
15.7% 1) Attorneys may ask the same question to
each juror and elicit individual responses.
36.6% 2) Attorneys may ask a question to the panel
and elicit individual responses.
a See United States v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1977) for an illustration
of this conflict.
He [defense counsel] then addressed a prospective juror by name and asked
whether that juror would want the accused to testify. The court [Judge
B.T. Moynahan, Jr.] asked counsel to approach the bench and admonished
him for singling out a juror and questioning him in an argumentative man-
ner. He informed counsel that he would only permit a juror to be ques-
tioned individually when that juror gave an unsatisfactory response to a
general question asked of the panel.
Id. at 396.
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17.9% 3) Attorneys may not ask individual questions
nor elicit individual responses unless I be-
lieve it is probable that the candid re-
sponse of one or more jurors will provide
information for challenge for cause or the
intelligent exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges.
29.9% 4) Attorneys may not ask individual questions
except when necessary to follow up answers
volunteered by jurors in response to ques-
tions put to the panel.
0.0% 5) Attorneys may not ask individual questions
nor elicit individual responses.
The lack of consensus on this question was borne out by
the follow-up interviews. One judge stated: "I think it's very
improper. The jurors are captive. They're sitting in the box by
order of the court, sworn to answer questions. The court
should protect jurors against any attempt by lawyers to single
them out." Another judge said that individual questioning was
seldom used but was very effective when employed. Still an-
other replied that individual questioning was used in all trials
in his court.
Obviously, jurors prefer not to be singled out for ques-
tioning before the panel. At present there is no consensus
among the judges on the issue of when, and under what cir-
cumstances, individual questioning is proper. There is need
for a standard recognizing jurors' interest in privacy and
describing the conditions under which individual questioning
is proper. Uniform treatment of this issue is highly desirable.
Part VI (B) of this article recommends a standard for
adoption.
6. Form of Voir Dire: Sequestered Questioning
Closely related to the issue of individual questioning is
that of private questioning. Kentucky judges were asked to in-
dicate their practice with the following explanation:
Attorneys will, on occasion, wish to question a juror outside
the presence of the other jurors. This can occur when a can-
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did response may be embarrassing to the juror or prejudicial
to the defendants. Attorneys may further seek sequestered
questioning on the premise that jurors will be candid in re-
vealing their biases if jurors are not forced to make a public
declaration of bias.
Table 7 indicates the judges' reluctance to permit sequestered
questioning except on a showing of potential juror embarrass-
ment or prejudice to one of the parties.
Table 7. Form of Voir Dire: Sequestered Questioning
5.4% 1) I permit sequestered questioning of jurors
if requested by an attorney.
12.4% 2) I permit sequestered questioning on a mat-
ter when I believe it is possible a juror will
not respond candidly to a group question.
16.3% 3) I permit sequestered questioning on a mat-
ter when I believe it is probable a juror will
not respond candidly to a group question.
53.5% 4) I do not permit sequestered questioning of
jurors unless it is clear that the juror is em-
barrassed or that the juror's response will
prejudice one of the parties.
12.4% 5) I do not permit sequestered questioning of
jurors.
In follow-up interviews, judges said that attorneys rarely
request sequestered questioning in advance. Rather, the need
for private questioning generally becomes apparent as a result
of an answer to a previous question. One judge provided the
following example:
Q: "Have any of you been represented by the firm of Smith
and Smith?"
Juror: "Yes, I have."
Q: "Is there anything about that representation that might
affect your judgment in this case?"
Juror: "Well ... maybe."
At this point the judge would intervene and call the juror to
the bench. The anticipated response might embarrass Attor-
ney Smith, the juror, or both. Another judge pointed out that
[Vol. 69
HeinOnline  -- 69 Ky. L.J. 304 1980-1981
VoiR DEtE IN KENTUCKY
all questioning about a juror's employment with or interest in
an insurance company should be done at the bench to avoid
interjecting the issue of insurance coverage into the case. 9 In
death penalty cases, several judges indicated they are likely to
grant requests for sequestered questioning in advance. 90
One judge suggested a way to put personal questions to
the panel and yet enjoy the candor of sequestered question-
ing. The judge should inform the jury that a series of personal
questions will be asked and instruct each juror to raise his
hand if the truthful answer to any of the questions is affirma-
tive. Upon raising his hand, the juror would be questioned at
the bench. The questioner should frame his questions so
broadly that no particular inference can be drawn from the
juror raising his hand. To illustrate this approach, consider
the problem raised by a need to inquire into the jurors' family
histories of mental illness. If the attorney (or judge) were to
ask, "How many of you have a family history of mental ill-
ness?", the jurors would be embarrassed and resentful. They
probably would not give complete and honest answers. Sup-
pose, however, after an explanation of the need for the in-
quiry, the questioner were to say, "If you, any member of your
family, or any friend or acquaintance has had any problems
with mental illness, would you so indicate by raising your
hand? We'll discuss it further at the bench." The juror should
realize that holding up his hand does nothing more than iden-
tify him as one who knows a person who is mentally ill. No
stigma is attached to being the acquaintance of the mentally
disturbed. This suggestion combines group questions with in-
dividual private responses; implementation should promote
candor and save time.
89 If a good faith basis exists for believing a juror or his family works for an
insurance company, follow-up questions are proper to determine whether the juror's
company is involved in the case. Insko v. Cummins, 423 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1968); Ash-
land Sanitary Milk Co. v. Messersmith's Adm'r, 32 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1930). Obviously,
such questioning should not be initiated in the presence of the other jurors.
" In Brown v. Commonwealth, 49 S.W. 544 (Ky. 1899), the juror being examined
exclaimed in the presence of ten previously accepted jurors that the accused "ought
to be hung." The trial court refused to excuse the accepted jurors, and the defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death. The Court upheld the death penalty.
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D. Voir Dire: Content
1. Juror Background Information
The Administrative Office of Courts developed a standard
Juror Summons and Qualification Forms1 that asks seven
questions pursuant to the juror qualification statute92 and
many other questions that do not relate to the juror's qualifi-
cations. The latter questions seek the following information
from the juror:
1) Birthplace;
2) Occupation, employer's name and years employed;
3) Spouse's occupation, employer's name and years
employed;
4) Marital status;
5) Number and ages of children;
6) Level of education;
7) Whether juror or any member of the juror's family has
made a claim for personal injury;
8) Whether any claim for personal injury has been made
against juror or a member of the juror's family;
9) Whether juror or a member of the juror's family has
been a party to a lawsuit and, if so, the kind of lawsuit; and
10) Whether juror or any member of the juror's family has
been a defendant or a witness or the complainant in a crimi-
nal case and if so, the year, county and state of the case.
It is questionable to imply, as the standard form does,
that prospective jurors must answer questions under penalty
of law that are irrelevant to the juror's qualification to serve.
A more reasonable approach would require jurors only to an-
91 Appendix 1 contains a standard juror qualification form.
92 See note 76 supra for text of the juror qualification statute. The following
questions were adapted from that statute:
1) Are you a citizen of the U.S.?-
2) Are you able to speak and understand English?-
3) Are you incapable, by reason of physical or mental disability, of render-
ing effective jury service?-
4) Have you been convicted of a felony and not pardoned?_
5) Are you presently under indictment?-
6) Have you served as a juror in a Kentucky state court within the last 12
months?-
7) What county are you a resident of?._
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swer questions that relate to qualification and permit jurors to
refuse disclosure on other matters on the form.
In addition to the data provided in the Juror Summons
and Qualification Form, attorneys may seek other background
information during voir dire in an attempt to analyze the per-
sonalities of jurors and predict how those personalities will re-
act to the parties and issues. Kentucky circuit judges were
asked to indicate their attitudes toward such questions. Table
8 reflects a relaxed attitude toward this type of questioning.
Table 8. Background Information
9.2% 1) I permit attorneys to freely ask jurors addi-
tional questions about their background
(examples: what magazines they subscribe
to, what television programs they watch,
whether they own their homes or rent,
what kind of car they drive).
58.5% 2) I permit attorneys to ask jurors additional
questions about their backgrounds if it can
be demonstrated that the answers may pro-
vide relevant information for the intelligent
exercise of peremptory challenges.
30.8% 3) I permit attorneys to ask jurors additional
questions about their backgrounds if the
question is directly relevant and the attor-
ney's need for this information outweighs
the jurors' right of privacy.
1.5% 4) I feel that the juror qualification sheets fur-
nish sufficient information about the jurors
for the exercise of peremptory challenges. I
do not permit attorneys to ask further
background questions of the jurors.
The responses to this question are surprising. Only thirty
percent of the judges said they require attorneys to show that
their questions are directly relevant and their need for infor-
mation outweighs the jurors' right of privacy. Sixty percent
said it is sufficient if the attorney shows that the answers
might provide relevant information; almost ten percent said
they permit attorneys to freely question jurors about their
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backgrounds. These responses indicate that judges do not feel
it necessary to keep tight control over this type of
questioning.
This conclusion is supported by the judges' responses to
other questions. A majority of judges said that attorneys
asked additional information questions in at least three-
fourths of their cases, and a large majority indicated that they
rarely or never sustained an objection (or intervened without
objection) to such a question. Thus, attorneys are permitted
in most of the circuit courts to question jurors freely about
their backgrounds. Nevertheless, it should be remembered
that 69.2% of the judges said they would intervene if the at-
torney was wasting time or embarrassing a juror. This re-
sponse indicates that attorneys generally do not advance
questioning to the point where the judge feels intervention is
necessary. The judges who indicated they rarely sustain an
objection to this type of question may subconsciously commu-
nicate the permissible boundaries of voir dire to attorneys in
their community. The wise attorney does not venture past
this line, and thus the judge is not required to punish
transgressors.
Additionally, the judges were asked their opinions about
two questions dealing with juror background, currently asked
in Fayette County.93 Both were endorsed overwhelmingly by
the judges. The questions were the juror's prior jury service
and whether the juror, his relatives or friends were involved
in law enforcement. Eighty-five percent of the judges found
the question of prior jury service appropriate, while ninety-
nine percent approved the inquiry into law enforcement
connections.
2. Jurors' Knowledge of or Relationship to the Case
The judges were given a list of specific questions dealing
with the jurors' knowledge of or relationship to the case. In
contrast to inquiries into jurors' backgrounds, the answers to
these questions could give rise to a challenge for actual or im-
plied bias, and the Kentucky high Court has held it to be
93 Appendix 2 contains the Fayette Circuit Court Juror's Personal Data Sheet.
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error to restrict voir dire on some of the questions below."
Short of revealing actual or implied bias, these questions call
for information which is directly, and in an obvious fashion,
used by attorneys in the exercise of peremptories. It is far eas-
ier to accept the logic of a challenge to a friend of the adver-
sary than to appreciate the reasoning behind challenges based
on what the juror reads or watches on television. As expected,
Kentucky judges overwhelmingly endorsed questions seeking
the jurors' knowledge of or relationship to the case.
Table 9. Scope of Voir Dire: Jurors' Knowledge of or
Relationship to the Case
Place a check mark beside those topics which you feel to be
appropriate for voir dire examination. Please check each
that applies
99% 1) Whether any jurors have personal knowledge
of any of the facts of the controversy;
91% 2) Whether any of the jurors have heard of the
incident (radio, television, newspaper, friend,
etc.);
97% 3) Whether any jurors have formed an opinion
about the matter;
97% 4) Relationship by blood or marriage to a party;
96% 5) Acquaintance with a party;
93% 6) Relationship by blood or marriage to a wit-
ness (would require each side to identify its
witnesses);
The Court of Appeals has reversed the trial court where questioning was not
permitted on (1) the relationship to a party, victim or key witness: Horton v. Com-
monwealth, 240 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1951); (2) acquaintance with party, victim or key
witness: Bourland v. Mitchell, 335 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1960) and Olympic Realty v.
Kamer, 141 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1940); (3) personal knowledge of the facts: Messer v.
Commonwealth, 181 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. 1944); (4) exposure to pre-trial publicity. Fergu-
son v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1974); (5) involvement of juror or relative
in similar event: Jackson v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1959); Sizemore v.
Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1957), and Drury v. Franke, 57 S.W.2d 969 (Ky.
1933); (6) racial prejudice: Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 40 S.W.2d 356
(Ky. 1931); (7) feelings about patricide, Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 545
(Ky. 1958).
1980-81]
HeinOnline  -- 69 Ky. L.J. 309 1980-1981
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
79% 7) Acquaintance with a witness;
94% 8) Employment or acquaintance with the attor-
neys;
81% 9) Employment or acquaintance with any mem-
ber of the attorneys' firms (would require
reading names of all attorneys in the firm);
27% 10) Employment or acquaintance with other ju-
rors;
96% 11) Personal involvement in an event similar to
that on trial;
75% 12) Involvement of a friend or relative in an
event similar to that on trial;
79% 13) Whether any jurors have served as jurors in
similar trials; and
84% 14) Whether jurors possess specialized knowl-
edge about an anticipated technical issue in
the case.
The judges endorsed all questions except the tenth, deal-
ing with a juror's relationship with other jurors. All the above
questions generally can be answered "yes" or "no," and do not
require the jurors to evaluate their attitudes on a specific
topic. At the same time honest responses are imperative, for
these questions bear directly on the juror's fitness for service
in a particular case. Questions of this type seem well-suited to
the judge's portion of voir dire. The judge does not need to
know in advance the details of the case at bar and can thus
rely on a standard set of questions applicable to all cases. Fur-
thermore, as a neutral authority figure, the judge can impress
on jurors the need for candor.
3. Jurors' Attitudes Toward the Issues and the Parties
While questions dealing with the jurors' knowledge of or
relationship to the case call for factual responses, attitude
questions seek the jurors' feelings toward matters that will
arise in the case. Such questions may be characterized fairly
as direct probes for actual bias. Table 10 reflects the Ken-
tucky circuit judges' standard practice when attorneys dare to
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confront jurors with their biases.
Table 10. Scope of Voir Dire: Attitudes Toward Issues or
Parties
44.0% 1) I permit attorneys to freely question jurors
about their attitudes toward characteristics
of the parties or the issues.
33.3% 2) I permit attorneys to probe for bias against
the parties or the issues when I believe it is
possible bias exists in the community.
21.2% 3) I permit attorneys to probe for bias only
when I believe it is probable that bias ex-
ists in the community.
1.5% 4) I do not permit attorneys to question jurors
about their attitudes toward characteristics
of the parties or the issues.
This survey indicates that Kentucky trial judges are very
liberal in permitting direct probes for bias. Kentucky's high
Court has held that there is a right to voir dire on central
issues where bias is probable. 5 Kentucky judges, however,
generally do not require a showing of probability; the mere
possibility of bias is sufficient. Indeed, forty-four percent of
the responding judges said they freely permit questioning di-
rected at the jurors' attitudes toward characteristics of the
parties or issues.
Consistent with this finding were the judges' responses to
the appropriateness of voir dire on specific attitudes when rel-
evant to the case. The following table reflects willingness to
permit voir dire on these matters.
Table 10a.
Do you believe voir dire on the following topics to be
appropriate (if relevant)? Check all that you believe to be
appropriate.
90.3% 1) Attitude toward blacks;
96.8% 2) Attitude toward those who use intoxicants;
96.8% 3) Attitude toward those who use drugs;
95 See note 94 supra for cases which support this proposition.
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75.8% 4) Attitude toward those who have been
convicted;
82.3% 5) Attitude toward homosexuals;
61.3% 6) Attitude toward unemployed persons;
72.6% 7) Attitude toward teenagers;
56.4% 8) Attitude toward working women with children
in day care;
69.4% 9) Attitude toward sex outside marriage;
96.8% 10) Attitude toward police;
91.9% 11) Attitude toward corporations; and
87.1% 12) Attitude toward non-residents of the county.
Direct probes for bias, however, are relatively rare in
Kentucky. Half of the responding judges said that such ques-
tions were asked in fewer than one-fourth of their cases. Con-
sistent with the view that such questions are proper, the
judges indicated that they rarely sustained objections to these
questions.
The infrequency of attitude questions was unexpected. A
trial in which no juror is suspected of harboring unfriendly
attitudes toward some aspect of an attorney's case is hard to
imagine. Attorneys could be expected to ask attitude ques-
tions to establish actual bias, to gain information for the exer-
cise of strikes, or to condition the jury to disregard an unsa-
vory fact which the attorney expects to surface during trialY6
Since attitude rarely is covered by the judge in a standard
voir dire,9 7 and since judicial acceptance of such questions is
high, the failure of attorneys to inquire about how jurors feel
is surprising. A logical explanation for this reluctance is the
fear that a probe for bias only can accentuate the unfortunate
aspects of the case.
9"When you have explosive material in your case such as a client who has
been convicted of a felony, who was driving under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the accident, or some other dangerous point, it should be
brought out as quickly as possible with the very first juror."
A. MORRLL, supra note 53, at 9.
7One judge commented "There's no way I can ask them how they feel about
something, because I don't know the case that well, and I don't know what the attor-
ney thinks is detrimental to his side."
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4. Jurors' Attitudes Toward the Law
Attorneys sometimes wish to question jurors about their
attitudes toward the applicable law. The ostensible reason is
to probe for bias against the law. An example of such a ques-
tion is: "The use of deadly physical force is justifiable when a
person believes such force is necessary to protect himself
against death or serious injury. How do you feel about such a
law?" Even though bias against the applicable law is a legiti-
mate subject for inquiry, such questions often appear as in-
struments of indoctrination or as attempts to anticipate the
instructions. Since the judge is responsible for giving instruc-
tions, the attorney who asks questions about the jurors' atti-
tudes toward the law may appear to be infringing upon the
judge's authority. Furthermore, the attorney's statement of
the law often will be an interpretation, undoubtedly favorable
to his side, and this may strike the judge as an attempt to
argue the case.
Whether these questions will be permitted depends
largely upon the form of the questions. One judge said he
would not allow the self-defense question in the form in which
it appears above but would permit a non-argumentative state-
ment of the defense, coupled with: "Can you follow the court's
instruction on self-defense?" A negative response to this ques-
tion would be grounds for challenge for cause.
Kentucky appellate court decisions in this area do not
provide much guidance to trial courts. In criminal cases the
courts have held that voir dire on jurors' attitudes toward the
presumption of innocence,98 self-defense,99 and the range of
punishment10o are legitimate but that "to instruct on the law
peculiar to the case or inquire into the jurors' knowledge of
that law" is improper and should not be allowed.101 In civil
"' Gross v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1953); cf. United States v.
Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973).
" Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1958).
100 Iles v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1970). But see Mercer v. Com-
monwealth, 330 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Ky. 1960) (improper but not prejudicial for the
prosecutor to ask the jury members if they could "follow the law as given by the court
and impose a life sentence"). The Court said this statement was improper because of
its "explicitness." Id.
101 Harrell v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Ky. 1959).
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cases the appellate court will defer to the discretion of the
trial court,10 2 subject to the admonition that "mind-condition-
ing" or "brainwashing" questions should not be permitted. 103
Table 11 records the Kentucky trial judges' responses to
the use of voir dire in ascertaining the jurors' attitudes toward
the law. Even though the judges generally were tolerant of
such questioning, many required a strong showing of probable
bias in the community, and a few purported to prohibit such
questioning.
Table 11. Scope of Voir Dire: Attitudes Toward the Law
48.5% 1) I permit attorneys to freely question jurors
about their attitudes toward the applicable
law.
21.2% 2) I permit attorneys to probe for bias against
the applicable law, when I believe it is pos-
sible that such bias exists in the commu-
nity.
16.7% 3) I permit attorneys to probe for bias against
the applicable law only when I believe it is
probable that such bias exists in the com-
munity.
13.6% 4) I do not permit attorneys to question jurors
about their attitudes toward the applicable
law.
Follow-up interviews confirmed the lack of uniformity on
this point. Three of the fifteen judges were quite tolerant of
this type of questioning, while the others, to varying degrees,
controlled this kind of inquiry. Four specifically said they pro-
hibited attorneys' attempts to commit jurors to follow the law.
Four others indicated that they listened carefully to insure
that attorneys did not misstate or embellish legal principles.
101 Compare Temperly v. Sarrington's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1956) (Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court in permitting plaintiff's counsel to ask jurors if
they would have any scruples against returning a verdict for the full amount if they
felt the law and evidence justified it) with Farrow v. Cundiff, 383 S.W.2d 119 (Ky.
1964) (Court upheld the trial court in denying plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to
ask the question asked in Temperly).
103 Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971).
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The questionnaire also asked judges to indicate whether
voir dire was appropriate, if relevant, on six specific legal
principles. The affirmative responses were:
Table 11a.
95.5% 1) Attitude toward the presumption of inno-
cence;
89.4% 2) Attitude toward the reasonable doubt
standard;
89.4% 3) Attitude toward the defense of insanity;
79.1% 4) Attitude toward the right of an accused not
to testify;
71.6% 5) Attitude toward contributory negligence
and;
86.6% 6) Attitude toward the right to money dam-
ages for pain and suffering.
These responses show a high level of acceptance toward ques-
tioning on these particular legal propositions.
The judges indicated that voir dire on attitudes toward
the law was more common in criminal cases than in civil
cases. This finding is not surprising. The defense attorney
wants to mention reasonable doubt and presumption of inno-
cence as often as possible, and the prosecutor may want to
voir dire jurors on their feelings toward the range of penalties
for the crime charged.
Sixty-five percent of the responding judges reported that
they rarely or never sustained an objection to this type of
question, or intervened in the absence of objection from op-
posing counsel. This response probably demonstrates that at-
torneys know what judges will tolerate. If the judge has indi-
cated that comments about contributory negligence are
improper during voir dire, the attorney will reserve comment
until his opening statement.
5. Hypothetical Questions
Hypothetical questions ask the jury to assume certain
facts and then to answer questions based on these assump-
tions. The attorney represents that he can prove the assumed
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facts. Hypothetical questions often are simply the attorney's
argument in question form. He is not seeking responses;
rather, he wants to commit the jury to a point of view prior to
the introduction of evidence. This type of questioning has
been criticized sharply as a perversion of voir dire.
10 4
Kentucky judges were questioned on the extent and de-
sirability of hypothetical questions in their courts. They were
given the following explanation.
The question may be general ("Do you believe that a
knife could come open suddenly in a struggle?"), or specific
("If Mike Jones were to testify that he had the knife in his
hand and it suddenly came open and accidentally cut John
Smith, do you believe this is possible?"). Often hypothetical
questions ask the jury to apply the anticipated instructions
to anticipated evidence. For example, "Suppose the facts
show the defendant is ninety percent at fault and the plain-
tiff only ten percent at fault. Would you hesitate to bring in
a verdict for the defendant, as the law requires?"
The judges were then asked to indicate their attitudes toward
hypothetical questions. In light of the criticism of such ques-
tions, a large number of Kentucky judges surprisingly permit
their use.
Table 12. Scope and Form of Voir Dire: Hypotheticals.
21.1% 1) I permit attorneys to freely ask hypotheti-
cal questions covering the anticipated in-
structions and evidence.
17.9% 2) I permit attorneys to ask general hypothet-
icals covering the anticipated instructions
and the attorneys' theory of the case. I do
not permit the attorneys to be specific in
stating what the evidence will be.
104 State v. Manley, 255 A.2d 193, 205 (N.J. 1969).
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23.4% 3) I permit attorneys to ask general hypothet-
icals covering their theory of the case. I do
not permit attorneys to be specific in stat-
ing what the evidence will be nor do I per-
mit the attorneys to ask hypotheticals in-
volving the anticipated instructions.
37.3% 4) I do not permit attorneys to ask hypotheti-
cal questions.
Although Kentucky's highest court has said that "brain-
washing" jurors in voir dire is improper,1 05 two-thirds of the
Kentucky trial judges said that under some circumstances
they would permit hypotheticals. Hypothetical questioning in
voir dire, however, is not a common practice in Kentucky
courts. Although a few judges estimated that such questions
were asked in over three-fourths of their cases, forty-six of
sixty-four respondents said that hypotheticals were attempted
in less than one-fourth of their cases. The hypothetical ques-
tion is not designed to select a jury; it is a tool of persuasion
employed at a stage of the proceedings when persuasion is im-
proper. A clear standard prohibiting hypotheticals would fur-
ther the administration of justice.
VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Findings
The results of the questionnaire and follow-up interviews
indicate the following:
1. Most Kentucky judges conduct an initial voir dire and
permit supplemental questions from counsel.
2. Kentucky lawyers use the Juror Summons and Qualifi-
cation Form in exercising their peremptory challenges.
3. Judges generally tolerate questions soliciting back-
ground information that does not appear in the juror quali-
fication form.
4. That part of the voir dire which asks jurors about their
relationship to the parties or to the case usually is con-
ducted by judges, who permit attorneys to ask supplemental
questions which bear on the propriety or desirability of the
105 Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc., 469 S.W.2d at 767.
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juror sitting on the case.
5. Judges generally do not ask jurors about their attitudes
toward a characteristic of the party or the case; however,
they permit attorneys to pursue such questioning.
6. A majority of judges permit attorneys to inquire into the
jurors' feelings about the applicable law. A strong minority
feels that if such questions are asked, the judge should be
the interrogator. Many judges permit attorneys a limited op-
portunity to make such inquiries but guard closely against
misstatements.
7. Judges vary greatly in their attitudes toward hypotheti-
cal questions. Some judges are tolerant of attorneys' efforts
to persuade through this medium; however, a large number
of responding judges do not permit hypothetical questions.
8. In the absence of an objection, judges will intervene
whenever a juror is being embarrassed or time is being
wasted. A majority of judges, however, will not stop efforts
at persuasion if the opponent fails to object.
9. Judges do not agree on the permissibility of individual
questioning. Most judges indicated that they either permit
attorneys to ask group questions and elicit individual re-
sponses, or they prohibit individual questioning except when
pursuing an answer already given by a juror.
10. Most judges permit sequestered questioning only when
the juror may be embarrassed or when the juror's response
may prejudice one of the parties. In those situations, most
judges call the juror to the bench on their own initiative.
11. Lengthy voir dire is rare in Kentucky.
B. Recommendations
Recognizing that the mechanics and content of voir dire
are within the discretion of trial judges, the following recom-
mendations are advanced to encourage uniformity and to pro-
tect more adequately the jurors' right of privacy.
1. Juror Qualification Form
The present standard juror qualification form asks two
types of questions, those that bear on juror qualification and
those that seek background data about the jurors. Answers to
the latter type of questions enable attorneys to generalize
about jurors and the way they will respond to issues in partic-
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ular cases. Accordingly attorneys would like the juror qualifi-
cation form expanded to include other questions generally
deemed useful in the exercise of peremptories.
The standard form, however, has no warning informing
jurors that the answers they give will be shared with attor-
neys.106 The form leaves jurors with the impression that all
questions must be answered, instead of telling jurors that only
those questions bearing on juror qualification must be
completed.
A recommendation on the qualification form must bal-
ance the jurors' legitimate interest in restricting the disclosure
of personal information against the attorneys' need for such
information in order to intelligently exercise their peremptory
challenges. The author recommends that the form be divided
into two parts; part one would consist of questions bearing on
juror qualification and part two would consist of questions
asking for background information. The juror would be in-
structed that the first part must be completed and that the
second part may be completed. Jurors would be encouraged to
complete the optional part 07 and be informed that their fail-
ure to provide the information requested might result in the
judge requiring answers to one or more of the questions
should the juror be called to sit on a case. The judge would
require background questions to be answered during voir dire
if directly relevant to issues in the case on trial. If the form is
not excessively long or overly personal, jurors will probably
complete both sections.
106 KRS § 29A.070(7) (1977) provides that the judge can order these forms with-
held, but the interviews indicated that this is rarely done. In United States v. Barnes,
604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision to withhold the names of the jurors both prior to and during the trial.
107 Since completion of part two of the questionnaire is not mandatory, the only
limitations are practical ones: whether the questions will yield valuable information;
whether jurors will be offended by the questions; and how many questions a juror can
be expected to answer. The development of a valid practical juror data sheet is be-
yond the scope of this article. Included in Appendix 3, however, is a personal data
sheet prepared by the Kentucky Office of Public Advocacy with the assistance of a
jury selection specialist. This sheet was approved for use in a criminal trial in Jeffer-
son Circuit Court in 1978 but has not been generally approved there.
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2. Division of Questioning Between the Judge and
Attorneys
After explaining the nature of the controversy, the judge
should question the jurors about their relationship to the par-
ties and the case. Since these questions solicit factual affirma-
tions or denials and since the judge is a neutral authority
figure who can impress upon the jurors the need for honesty
and candor, the judge is particularly well suited to ask these
questions. Judges can develop or adopt standardized ques-
tions covering most of the situations which give rise to im-
plied bias.
The judge is also the appropriate party to ask initial
questions about the jurors' attitudes toward the applicable
law. If the attorneys desire the jurors to be questioned about
their feelings toward legal propositions (reasonable doubt, for
example), this should be made known to the judge prior to
trial. The judge should then state the applicable law and ask
the jurors if they have reservations about applying those legal
principles.
While the judge should initiate questions on the jurors'
attitudes toward the applicable law, questions that relate to
the jurors' attitudes toward the issues and the parties should
begin with the attorneys. By such questions the examiner
searches for actual bias. Attorneys know their case better than
does the judge and will have made tactical decisions about the
desirability of such questioning. Only the attorneys can be ex-
pected to know which issues will arise during the case and to
decide whether inquiry into the jurors' attitudes is tactically
wise. The judge should permit such questioning whenever he
feels it possible that community bias exists.
If a juror responds to a question put by the judge in such
a way as to raise the possibility that the juror may be the sub-
ject of a challenge for cause, the attorneys should be permit-
ted to ask follow-up questions before the judge asks the juror
if he can be fair. The judge's initial questioning on any topic
should be as factual as possible; the juror should not at this
time be asked to evaluate his feelings or the way an event in
his life might affect his consideration of the evidence. This
recommendation recognizes the preclusive effect of the "will
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that affect your verdict?" type question on the ability of coun-
sel to show implied or actual bias which will support a chal-
lenge for cause. After questioning by counsel it is appropriate
for the judge to ask the juror if he can be fair.
3. Protecting the Jurors' Right of Privacy
At the beginning of voir dire, the judge should impress on
jurors the need for forthright responses. The judge should also
inform jurors that if they desire to speak outside the presence
of the other jurors, they should raise their hands whereupon
they will be called to the bench. Questions should be phrased
so that no embarrassing inferences can be drawon from a ju-
ror's raising his hand. For example, the defense attorney who
wants to know whether a juror's experiences have made him
unduly hostile toward those suspected of using drugs should
ask the jury: "Have drugs affected you, a member of your
family, a friend or an acquaintance?" Such a question permits
the juror whose son is an addict to raise his hand and ap-
proach the bench without publicly identifying the nature of
the problem.
4. Individual Questioning
The conflicting interests of the attorney, who desires as
much individual questioning as possible; of the judge, who
attempts to prevent indoctrination and excessive time con-
sumption; and of the juror, who wishes not to be embarrassed
before his peers, necessitate a balancing approach to this con-
troversial issue. Attorneys initially should question the panel
rather than individual jurors. On any issue where bias is possi-
ble, however, attorneys should be permitted to proceed either
by open ended questions with volunteered responses or by
closed questions with required responses. On the issue of the
use of drugs, an example of the first type question would be:
"How do you feel about those who use drugs"? An example of
the second type question would be: "Would your feelings
about drugs make it difficult for you to return a verdict for my
client?" With the latter form of questioning the attorney
1980-81]
HeinOnline  -- 69 Ky. L.J. 321 1980-1981
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
could ask each juror to respond.10 8
In addition the judge should, on request, elicit individual
responses to questions directed to jurors' attitudes toward the
applicable law. Finally neither the judge nor an attorney
should single out a juror for a narrative response in front of
the other jurors.
5. Sequestered Questioning
On extremely important and sensitive matters, such as ju-
rors' views about capital punishment, the judge should permit
sequestered questoning of jurors,109 and ask, or permit to be
asked, questions calling for narrative responses.
6. Hypothetical Questioning
Because hypothetical questions are used primarily as a
means of indoctrinating jurors, their use should be prohibited.
It is hoped all Kentucky circuit judges will consider adop-
tion of these suggestions. Reflecting for the most part the pre-
vailing practice in the state, these recommendations seek uni-
formity and an appropriate balance between the conflicting
interests of judge, juror and attorney in the voir dire process.
I'l Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise
of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1493, 1525 (1975).
109 Undoubtedly, sequestered questioning of each juror in each case would pro-
vide more information for the exercise of challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges. Such a procedure would lengthen trials substantially and would cause some
resentment among jurors. Most judges conclude that the disadvantages of such ques-
tioning outweigh the benefits. However, when the issues are serious, the judge and
jury should be willing to endure some inconvenience. Michael Nietzel, Professor of
Psychology at the University of Kentucky and an expert on jury selection, recently
undertook a study of 11 Kentucky cases in which the death penalty was sought. In
three cases jurors were sequestered; in four cases the judge permitted only group
questioning in open court; in the other cases there was some individual or sequestered
questioning. Nietzel found that sequestered individual questioning identified seven
times as many biased jurors (successful challenges for cause) as did group questioning
in open court. M. Nietzel & R. Dillehay, Effects of Voir Dire Procedure in Capital
Murder Trials (unpublished manuscript under editorial review).
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Appendix 1
AOC-7"-401
commonwealth of Kentucky
Court Of JUROR SUMMONS AND
QUALIFICATION FORM
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
GREETINGS: You are hereby notified by the Chief Circuit Judge of County that you have bee leicte
to serve as a trial juror. You are, therefore, summoned to appear at t1e 'the die showi.
Datem
Circuit Clerk
Pla eothe qualification form below. You should type or print legibly with dark ballpoint pen. IS FORM MUST U
THE CIRCUIT CLERK'S OFFICE WITHIN TEN DAYS EITHER INPERON OR BY MAI L
CAUTION: No person shall willfully misrepresent a material fact on a Juror Qualification Form, KRS 29A.070(6).
nave you or any mener ot your tamy ever mane a cam io personai injury. , e... rIo_
Has a claim for personal injury ever been made against you or a member of your family? Yes...--- ...... No_ If yes,
what type?
Have you or a member of your family ever been party to a lawsuit? Yes- . No- .- If yes, what type? -
Have you or a member of your family ever been a defendant, witness, or complainant in a criminal case? Ycs-.......... No...-
If yes, what year, county, and state?
What level of education have you completed?
Are you a citizen of the U.S.? Yes__ No__
Are you able to speak or understand the English language? Yes. - No-___
Are you incapable, by reason of physical or mental disability, of rendering effective jury service? (A doctor's note is required and
it must be returned with these completed forms to establish disqualiication). Yes - No
Have you been previously convicted of a felony and not been pardoned by the Governor or other authorized persn of the juris-
diction in which you were convicted? Yes- - No__
Are you presently under indictment? Yes - No____
Have you served as a juror in a Kentucky State Court within the past twelve months? Yes . No . If yea. Court
where you were a juror
I am a resident of County.
If you think you have avalid excuse for not serving as a juror, explain your reason below.
NOTE. ALL JURORS THAT ARE DISQUALIFIED OR EXCUSED WILL BE NOTIFIED BY PHONE OR MAIL.
PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING PHONE NUMBERS.
HOME PHONE BUSINESS PHONE SPOUSES BUSINESS PHONE EP9 GENCY PHOM
1980-81]
I certify that the information given above is correct and complie to the beg of my knowied.
Sig nar Dwte
(See Reverse Side)
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Appendix 1 continued
PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY!
Below you will find general information that will be useful to you. In addition, there is a Juror Qualification Form on tha ctb
side of this page that must be filled out by you. Detach and mail the Juror Qualification Form to the Circuit Clere's OT= f i sft
ten days. Return the completed form to:
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS SUMMONS IS PUNISHABLE AS CONTEMPT OF COURT, ERS 29A.I.0.
GENERAL INFORMATION
JURY TERM: Jury services is usually for a thirty-day period beginning on the day shown on the summons.
JURY FEE: Jurors receive $12.50 a day for their services ($5.00 pay and $7.50 expenses).
TELEPHONE: To report an absence or receive an emergency call while serving as a juror, you may all
NOTE TO EMPLOYERS: KRS 29A.160(l) states that an cmployer shall not deprive an employee of his employment or theee
or otherwise coerce him with respect thereto, because the employce receives a summons, responds thereto. serves as a iscoc or
attends court for prospective jury service. Any employer who violates this law is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor (ItRS
29A.990(l). A work excuse will be provided for those persons requesting one.
Fmr Office Use Only
PANEL NUMBER STRICKEN BY WHOM BOX NUMBER. OF JUROR
JUROR BADGE NUMBER
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Appendix 2
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
JUROR'S PERSONAL DATA SHEET
Yes No
Name Age - Are You a Citizen of IS?
Address Telephone Number
Zip Home Business Ext.
Yes No
Years of Residence in Ky - In Fayette Co. - Do you speak and
understand English
Occupation Employer
(If Retired) Last Occupation Employer
Education Completed: Grade School - High School - College - Graduate School
Marital Status: Married - Single - Separated - Divorced - Widow(er)
Spouse's First Name: Occupation: Employer:.
(If a widow(er) Spouse's Last Occupation Employer
List all members of your immediate family by relationship (other than spouse)
Relationship Age Occupation Employer
Have you, or any member of your family been the victim of a crime?
If so, please describe
Have you ever been accused of a crime, with the exception of a traffic offense?
Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Yes - No - Are you now under indictment?
If Yes, Have you been pardoned? Yes - No - Yes.. No
Are you related to, or a close friend of any law enforcement officer? Yes - No
Have you ever served as a Juror in Circuit Court before? Yes - No -
If you did, when and where?
Has a claim of $500 or more ever been asserted by or against you or a member of your immediate
family? If so, give the date and nature of each claim (automobile accident, breach of contract,
will, etc.) also state whether claim involved you or member of family?
Do you have any physical or mental condition which makes it impossible for you to serve?
Yes - No - If Yes, please explain
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING
ANSWERS ARE TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY
KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT
A WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION OF THESE
ANSWERS MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY A FINE OR
IMPRISONMENT, OR BOTH.
SIGNATURE OF PERSON SUMMONED FOR JURY DUTY RETURN THIS FORM PRIOR TO
SIGNATURE OF PERSON WHO COMPLETED FORM AND
REASONS FOR DOING SO (IF OTHER THAN PERSON
SUMMONED) THE EVENING OR MORNING PRIOR
TO REPORTING CALL 233-1640 TO
ADDRESS OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM DETERMINE WHETHER YOU
(IF OTHER THA PERSON COESUMMONED) SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT REPORT
AS DIRECTED.
For Court Use Only. Juror Disqualified.
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Appendix 3
JUROR ID NO.
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
JUROR'S PERSONAL DATA SHEET
1. Name:
2. Home Address:
3. Have you lived at any other address in the last 5 years?
If so, what address?
4. Years of residence in Kentucky ; in Jefferson County
5. Occupation:
Employer:
6. For whom else have you worked in the last 5 years?
7. Spouse's Name:
Occupation:
Employer:
8. For whom else has your spouse worked in the last 5 years?
9. List all members of your immediate family.
Name Relationship Age Occupation Employer
10. Have you or any member of your family been a victim of a crime?
If yes, explain:
12. Are you, or any member of your family, related to or a close friend of any law
enforcement officer?
13. Have you ever appeared as a witness in circuit court?
Was this a civil - or criminal - case? Did you appear on behalf of the
plaintiff (or state) - or the defendant_
14. Have you ever served as a juror before?
Was this a civil or criminal case?
What was the result of that case?
15. Do you (1) Own a house? - (2) Rent? - (3) Live with someone else?
(4) Other
16. Are the people in your neighborhood all white? -
All black? - both black and white? -
17. How much education have you completed:
Grade School - High School
College Graduate work
19. How do you keep up with the news? Radio - TV - Newspaper
Magazines - Friends -
20. Do you read newspapers? Regularly - Somewhat - A little - None
21. Which TV newsprograms do you watch more? Local News - National News
Both about the same - None -
22. Indicate whether you have any problem with hearing - eyesight - or any
other medical condition
23. Please list any organizations or associations to which you belong, such as PTA,
social clubs, national organizations:
23. Please list any such organizations or associations to which your spouse belongs:
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